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Abstract
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc) is a generalisation of the
classical Hospitals / Resident problem (hr) that is important in practical applications
because it models the case where couples submit joint preference lists over pairs of
(typically geographically close) hospitals. In this paper we give a new NP-completeness
result for the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists, in highly restricted
instances of hrc. Further, we present an Integer Programming (IP) model for hrc
and extend it the case where preference lists can include ties. Further, we describe an
empirical study of an IP model or HRC and its extension to the case where preference
lists can include ties. This model was applied to randomly generated instances and also
real-world instances arising from previous matching runs of the Scottish Foundation
Allocation Scheme, used to allocate junior doctors to hospitals in Scotland.
1 Introduction
The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) matches graduating medical students
to hospitals in the US, matching 25,526 students in 2012. Similarly, in Scotland, until
recently, medical graduates were matched to Foundation Programme places via the Scot-
tish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS). Centralised matching schemes such as NRMP
and SFAS have had to evolve to accommodate linked couples who wish to be allocated to
(geographically) compatible hospitals. The requirement to consider the joint preferences
of couples has been in place in the NRMP context since 1983 and more recently in the
case of SFAS. The underlying allocation problem for NRMP and SFAS can modelled by
the so called Hospitals / Residents Problem with Couples (hrc).
An instance of the Hospitals Residents Problem with Couples consists of a set of hos-
pitals H and a set of residents R. The residents in R are partitioned into two sets, S and
S′. The set S consists of single residents and the set S′ consists of those residents involved
in couples. There is a set C = {(ri, rj) : ri, rj ∈ S′} of couples such that each resident in
S′ belongs to exactly one pair in C.
Each single resident ri ∈ S expresses a linear preference order over some subset of the
hospitals in H, representing the hospitals that resident ri ﬁnds acceptable; any hospital not
in this subset is therefore unacceptable to ri. Each pair of residents (ri, rj) ∈ C expresses
a joint linear preference order over a subset A of H ×H where (hp, hq) ∈ A represents the
joint assignment of ri to hp and rj to hq. The hospital pairs in A represent those joint
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assignments that are acceptable to (ri, rj), all other joint assignments being unacceptable
to (ri, rj).
Each hospital hj ∈ H expresses a linear preference order over those residents who ﬁnd
hj acceptable, either as a single resident or as part of a couple. Also, each hospital hj ∈ H
has a capacity, cj , its maximum number of available posts.
The preferences expressed in this fashion are reciprocal: if a resident ri is acceptable
to a hospital hj , either as a single resident or as part of a couple, then hj is also acceptable
to ri, and vice versa. A many-to-one matching between residents and hospitals is sought,
which is a set of acceptable resident-hospital pairs such that each resident appears in at
most one pair and each hospital appears in a number of pairs that does not exceed its
capacity. Further, each couple (ri, rj) is either jointly unmatched, meaning that both ri
and rj are unmatched, or jointly matched to some pair (hk, hl) that (ri, rj) ﬁnd acceptable.
In an hrc instance we seek a stable matching, which guarantees that no resident
and hospital, and no couple and pair of hospitals, has an incentive to deviate from their
assignments and become matched to each other.
Roth [8] considered stability in the hrc context although did not deﬁne the concept
explicitly. However, a variety of stability deﬁnitions do exist in the hrc context [2, 3, 5].
The deﬁnition of stability applied in the work which follows is that given by McDermid
and Manlove in [5], shown below in Deﬁnition 1, which gives those mutually acceptable
pairs, (ri, hk) and ((ri, rj), (hk, hl)), whose existence would block a matching in hrc.
Deﬁnition 1. A matching M is stable if none of the following holds:
1. The matching is blocked by a hospital hj and a single resident ri, as in the classical
HR problem.
2. The matching is blocked by a couple (ri, rj) and a hospital hk such that either
(a) (ri, rj) prefers (hk,M(rj)) to (M(ri),M(rj)), and hk is either undersubscribed
in M or prefers ri to some member of M(hk)\{rj} or
(b) (ri, rj) prefers (M(ri), hk) to (M(ri),M(rj)), and hk is either undersubscribed
in M or prefers rj to some member of M(hk)\{ri}
3. The matching is blocked by a couple (ri, rj) and (not necessarily distinct) hospitals
hk = M(ri), hl = M(rj); that is, (ri, rj) prefers the joint assignment (hk, hl) to
(M(ri),M(rj)), and either
(a) hk = hl, and hk (respectively hl) is either undersubscribed in M or prefers ri
(respectively rj) to at least one of its assigned residents in M ; or
(b) hk = hl, and hk has at least two free posts in M , i.e., ck − |M(hk)| ≥ 2; or
(c) hk = hl, and hk has one free post in M , i.e., ck − |M(hk)| = 1, and hk prefers
at least one of ri, rj to some member of M(hk); or
(d) hk = hl, hk is full in M , hk prefers ri to some rs ∈ M(hk), and hk prefers rj
to some rt ∈ M(hk)\{rs}.
An instance of hrc need not admit a stable matching [9]. Also an instance may admit
stable matchings of diﬀering sizes [1]. Further, the problem of deciding whether there
exists a stable matching in an instance of hrc is NP-complete, even in the restricted case
where there are no single residents and all of the hospitals have only one available post
[7, 6].
Let (α, β)-hrc denote the restriction of hrc in which each single resident’s preference
list contains at most α hospitals, each couple’s preference list contains at most α pairs of
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hospitals and each hospital’s preference list contains at most β residents. In many practical
applications the residents’ preference lists are short. However, the problem remains hard
even in this case and Manlove and McDermid [5] showed that (3, 6)-hrc is NP-complete.
In Section 2 of this paper we present a new NP-completeness result for the problem of
deciding whether there exists a stable matching in an instance of (2, 3)-hrc and a summary
of an Integer Programming (IP) model for ﬁnding a maximum cardinality stable matching
in an instance of hrc. Further, in Section 3 we present an empirical study of this model
as applied to randomly generated instances and also real-world instances arising from
previous matching runs of SFAS. Some conclusions are given in Section 4.
2 Complexity of hrc and IP model
In a technical report by the same authors [4] we prove the following new result; for space
reasons the details of the proof are omitted.
Theorem 1. Given an instance of (2, 3)-hrc, the problem of deciding whether the instance
supports a stable matching is NP-complete. The result holds even if there are no single
residents and each hospital has capacity 1.
In [4] we give an IP model for ﬁnding a maximum cardinality stable matching in hrc.
Each model has O(m) binary-valued variables and O(m+ cL2) constraints where m is the
total length of the hospitals’ preference lists, c is number of couples and L is the maximum
length of a couple’s preference list. The space complexity of each model is O(m(m+ cL2))
and each model can be built in O(m4) time. For space reasons the details of the models
are omitted.
3 Empirical Results
We ran experiments on a Java implementation of the IP model as described in [4] applied
to both randomly-generated and real data. We present data showing (i) the average time
taken to ﬁnd a maximum cardinality stable matching or report that no stable matching
exists, and (ii) the average size of a maximum cardinality stable matching where a stable
matching did exist. All experiments were carried out on a desktop PC with an Intel i5-
2400 3.1Ghz processor, with 8Gb of memory running Windows 7. The IP solver used in
all cases was CPLEX 12.4 and the model was implemented in Java using CPLEX Concert.
To test our implementation for correctness we used a brute force algorithm which
recursively generated all possible matchings admitted by an hrc instance and selected
a maximum cardinality stable matching from amongst those matchings or reported that
none of the generated matchings was stable. Due to the ineﬃciency of this algorithm
it may only be realistically applied to relatively small instances. When solving several
thousand hrc instances involving up to 15 residents our implementation agreed with the
brute force algorithm when reporting whether the instance admitted a stable solution and
further our implementation returned a stable matching of the same size as a maximum
cardinality stable matching output by the brute force algorithm.
Experiments with randomly generated instances. In our ﬁrst experiment, we
report on data obtained as we increased the number of residents while maintaining a
constant ratio of couples, hospitals and posts to residents. For various values of x (100 ≤
x ≤ 1000) in increments of 30, 1,000 randomly generated instances were created containing
x residents, 0.1x couples and 0.1x hospitals with x available posts which were unevenly
distributed amongst the hospitals.
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Figure 1: Data obtained when attempting to ﬁnd a maximum cardinality stable matching
in randomly generated instances from Experiment 1.
The data in Figure 1 show that the mean time to ﬁnd a maximum cardinality stable
matching increased as we increased the number of residents in the instance. Figure 1 also
shows that the percentage of hrc instances that admit a stable matching does not appear
to be correlated with the number of residents involved in the instance and that as the
number of residents in the instances increased, the mean size of the maximum cardinality
stable matching supported by the instances increased linearly with the number of residents
involved the instance.
In the second experiment, we report data as we increased the the percentage of residents
involved in couples while maintaining the same total number of residents, hospitals and
posts. For various values of x (0 ≤ x ≤ 250) in increments of 25, 1,000 randomly generated
instances were created containing 1000 residents, x couples (and hence 1000 − 2x single
residents) and 100 hospitals with 1000 available posts which were unevenly distributed
amongst the hospitals.
The data in Figure 2 show that the mean time to ﬁnd a maximum cardinality stable
matching increased as we increased the number of residents involved in couples. Further,
Figure 2 shows that the percentage of hrc instances admitting a stable matching fell as
the percentage of residents in the instances involved in couples increased. When 50% of
the residents in the instance were involved in a couple, 832 of the 1000 instances admitted
a stable matching. Figure 2 also shows that as the percentage of residents in the instances
involved in couples increased the mean size of a maximum cardinality stable matching
tended to decrease.
Performance of the model with real world data. The Hospitals / Residents
Problem with Couples and Ties (hrct) is a generalisation of hrc in which hospitals
(respectively residents) may ﬁnd some subsets of their acceptable residents (respectively
hospitals) equally preferable. Residents (respectively hospitals) that are found equally
preferable by a hospital (respectively resident) are tied with each other in the preference
list of that hospital (respectively resident). It is straightforward to adapt Deﬁnition 1 to
the hrct case.
SFAS assigns junior doctors to two-year training posts in Scotland. In this process
the hospitals preferences are derived from the residents’ scores, where a junior doctor’s
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Figure 2: Data obtained when attempting to ﬁnd a maximum cardinality stable matching
in randomly generated instances from Experiment 2.
score is derived from their previous academic performance. If two residents receive the
same score, they will be tied in a hospital’s preference list. Thus, the underlying SFAS
matching problem may be correctly modelled by hrct.
Hence, we further extended our implementation to solve instances of hrct as described
in [4] and were able to ﬁnd a maximum cardinality stable matching admitted by the
real data obtained from the SFAS context. The sizes of the maximum cardinality stable
matchings obtained in the SFAS context for the three years to 2012 are shown in Table 1
alongside the time taken to ﬁnd these matchings.
4 Conclusions
We conclude that the IP model presented in this paper performs well when ﬁnding a
maximum cardinality stable matching in instances that are similar to those arising in the
SFAS application. It remains to investigate the performance of the model as we increase
the size of the instance beyond that of the SFAS application.
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